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27.1 Introduction
The need to determine the scope of EU policies is not a new challenge in the case law of
the Court. The extent of the powers of European Union institutions – beyond its constitu-
tional significance – also bears considerable practical importance, considering factors such
as decision making procedures to be applied, actors involved in the procedure, the binding
force of the legal measures in question, as well as the scope of judicial review. The delimi-
tation of EU policies raises further delicate questions in respect of the field of external
actions where crucial – commercial, defence and security policy – interests of national
governments are at stake, not to mention the particular interests of the other actors of EU
governance.
The present case provided the first opportunity for the Court of Justice to interpret the
scope of new prerogatives of the European Parliament granted by the Treaty of Lisbon, in
the procedure for the conclusion of CFSP international agreements between the EU and
a Third State. The action of the Parliament calls on the Court, in the context of the fight
against piracy off the coast of Somalia, to clarify the boundary between three fields of the
European Union’s external action, namely the common foreign and security policy (CFSP),
the external dimension of the area of freedom, security and justice (AFSJ) and development
cooperation.
* Research fellow, MTA-DE Public Service Research Group, Debrecen, bartha.ildiko@law.unideb.hu.
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27.2 Facts and Background
The case is related to the Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of
Mauritius on the conditions of transfer of suspected pirates and associated seized property
from the European Union-led naval force (EUNAVFOR) to the Republic of Mauritius and
on the conditions of suspected pirates after transfer.1 The agreement defines the conditions
and modalities for the transfer of persons suspected of committing acts of piracy within
the EUNAVFOR’s operation area, and governs the treatment, prosecution and trial of
such transferred persons. It also authorises the parties to develop implementing arrange-
ments on financial, technical and other assistance to enable the transfer, detention, inves-
tigation, prosecution and trial of transferred persons.
The agreement was adopted in order to implement the Joint Action of the Union which
aims to contribute to international cooperation to combat piracy and to put into effect
related Security Council resolutions. In the latter resolution, the Security Council expressed
its concern over the threat that acts of piracy and armed robbery against vessels pose to
the prompt, safe and effective delivery of humanitarian aid to Somalia, the safety of com-
mercial maritime routes and international navigation. “States and regional organisations,”
such as the EU have also been called upon “[…] to take action to protect shipping involved
with the transportation and delivery of humanitarian aid to Somalia and United Nations-
authorised activities”.2
In support of these resolutions, the Joint Action provides for a military operation called
“Atalanta” to be carried out in order to contribute to the protection of the vessels of the
World Food Programme (WFP) delivering food aid to displaced persons in Somalia, as
well as to the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery
off the Somali coast. The Joint Action also invites Third States to participate in the opera-
tion.
On 22 March 2010, the Council authorised the High Representative of the Union for
Foreign Affairs and Security to open negotiations with a view to concluding transfer
agreements with several Third States, including the Republic of Mauritius. On the same
day, the Council informed the President of the Parliament of said decision. The negotiations
resulted in the adoption of the contested decision on 12 July 2011,3 by which the Council
authorised the signing of the Agreement. The Agreement was signed on 14 July 2011. The
contested decision and the Agreement were published in the Official Journal of the European
1 OJ 2011 L 254, p. 1; hereinafter referred to as: ‘the contested agreement’ or ‘the EU-Mauritius Agreement’.
2 Resolution 1814 (2008) of the Security Council.
3 Council Decision 2011/640/CFSP of 12 July 2011 on the signing and conclusion of the Agreement between
the European Union and the Republic of Mauritius on the conditions of transfer of suspected pirates and
associated seized property from the European Union-led naval force to the Republic of Mauritius and on
the conditions of suspected pirates after transfer. OJ 2011 L 254, p. 1 (hereinafter: ‘the contested decision’).
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Union on 30 September 2011. By its letter dated 17 October 2011, the Council informed
the President of the Parliament of the adoption of the contested decision and of the signing
of the Agreement. The Parliament asked the Court to annul the contested decision.
27.3 Arguments of the Parties
In support of its action, the Parliament put forward two pleas in law. By its first plea, it
submitted that the contested decision concerned an agreement which did not relate
‘exclusively’ to the CFSP within the meaning of Article 218(6)(2) TFEU, and could not
therefore have been adopted without the Parliament’s involvement. By its second plea, it
argued that, by failing to inform it ‘immediately and fully’ at all stages of the negotiations
and of the conclusion of the EU-Mauritius Agreement,4 the Council infringed Article
218(10) TFEU, which applies to all agreements concluded by the European Union,
including those falling within the ambit of the CFSP.
As its main line of argument, the Parliament stated that Article 218(6) TFEU established
a general rule that the conclusion of an international agreement by the Council must be
preceded by the consent or the consultation of the Parliament. From that perspective, it
was only by way of an exception that the provision authorised the Council to conclude
such agreements without involving the Parliament ‘where agreements relate exclusively
to the [CFSP]’. Since that provision provided for an exception, it should have been inter-
preted narrowly.
Next, the Parliament argued against the exclusivity of the contested agreement’s “CFSP-
character”, submitting that the EU-Mauritius Agreement, in view of its aim and content,
related not only to the CFSP, but also to judicial cooperation in criminal matters, police
cooperation and development cooperation. The Parliament also concluded – based on the
principle of parallelism between internal and external EU competences – that since the
ordinary legislative procedure applies to said fields of EU (internal) action, the contested
decision should have been based on Article 218(6)(a)(v) TFEU and, therefore, adopted
only after the consent of the Parliament had been obtained. The fact that the agreement
implemented Joint Action 2008/851 and that the latter fell within the CFSP was not suffi-
cient to conclude that the contested decision also fell within that policy, since they had a
different scope and objectives. The tasks which had been entrusted to the representatives
of the European Union under the EU-Mauritius Agreement, the Parliament maintained,
were not of a military nature and went beyond the objective(s) of Atalanta.
4 The Council only informed the Parliament of the decision by which it authorised the High Representative
of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security to open negotiations with a view to concluding agreements
for the transfer of persons between the European Union and certain third States, including the Republic of
Mauritius, as well as of the adoption of the contested decision.
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As to its second plea, the Parliament alleged that firstly, the Council had failed to keep
it informed in the course of the negotiation phase of the Agreement, and secondly, had
waited more than three months before communicating to it the contested decision and
the Agreement.
It is interesting to note that the substantive legal basis of the decision was not challenged
in the present case. The Parliament did not claim by this plea that the contested decision
should have been founded on a provision other than Article 37 TEU. Accordingly, in the
action there was no reference to the breach of those Articles of the TFEU providing for
the substantive legal basis of the contested actions, nor was there mention of an infringe-
ment of Article 40 TEU.5 The Parliament did not contest that the measures at stake pursue
aims which predominantly fall within CFSP with Article 37 TEU serving as an appropriate
substantive legal basis. It merely stated (albeit not in the action but at the hearing) that the
agreement and the contested decision should have been founded on other bases in addition
to that provision, namely on Articles 82 TFEU, 87 TFEU and 209 TFEU.
In its defence, the Council, supported by all intervening Member States,6 responded
that the contested decision was correctly based on Article 37 TEU and Article 218(5) and
(6) TFEU, given that, according to its aim and content, the EU-Mauritius Agreement
related exclusively to the CFSP. Firstly, based on the “centre of gravity” test,7 it argued that
the agreement forms part of the implementation of Joint Action 2008/851 which aimed
to strengthen international security in the framework of the European Union’s common
security and defence policy. With reference to Article 21(2) TEU8 the Council added that
the agreement included measures which had an objective – to promote the rule of law and
respect for human rights in a third country: the Republic of Mauritius – that also fell within
the purview of the CFSP. The Council also contested the Parliament’s argument that the
aims of the agreement pertained to other EU policies.
5 “The implementation of the common foreign and security policy shall not affect the application of the
procedures and the extent of the powers of the institutions laid down by the Treaties for the exercise of the
Union competences referred to in [the TFEU].”
6 The Czech Republic, the French Republic, the Italian Republic, the Kingdom of Sweden and the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland intervened in support of the Council; and the Commission
in support of the Parliament.
7 Also known as the ‘classic aim and content’ test [a term borrowed from Ester Herlin-Karnell, ‘“Light
Weapons” and the Dynamics of Art 47 EU – The EC’s Armoury of Ever Expanding Competences’, The
Modern Law Review 71, 2008, p. 1002]. The formula, which is the product of established case-law, reads as
follows: “The choice of the legal basis for an EU measure must rest on objective factors amenable to judicial
review, which include the aim and content of that measure. If examination of a measure reveals that it
pursues two aims or that it has two components, and if one of those aims or components is identifiable as
the main one, whereas the other is merely incidental, the measure must be founded on a single legal basis,
namely that required by the main or predominant aim or component.” See, inter alia, Case C-155/91
Commission v. Council [1993] ECR I-939, paras. 19 and 21; Case C-36/98 Spain v. Council [2001] ECR I-
779, para. 59; and Case C-338/01 Commission v. Council, para. 55.
8 See analysis above.
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By invoking the principle of institutional balance, Sweden and the United Kingdom
argued that the interpretation of Article 218(6) TFEU advocated by the Parliament is not
in line with the strictly limited role for the Parliament in the implementation of the CFSP,
which obviously follows from Article 36 TEU. Moreover, such an interpretation, would
be contrary to the spirit of Article 40 TEU which guarantees that competences conferred
by the TFEU do not encroach on CFSP competences.
As regards the second plea of the Parliament, the Council claimed that this was inad-
missible in so far as the Court had no jurisdiction to rule on whether or not an agreement
relating exclusively to the CFSP complied with the information obligation laid down in
Article 218(10) TFEU.9 In the alternative scenario, should the Court accept jurisdiction
to rule on this question, the Council could not be held liable for violating that provision.10
The Council argued that the period within which the Parliament was informed of the
contested decision, “albeit slightly longer than usual, was still reasonable, taking into
account also the fact that this period included the summer break.”
27.4 Opinion of Advocate General Bot: The Council’s Victory
27.4.1 The CFSP Takes It All
In his Opinion, AG Bot provided a detailed analysis for determining the policy area which
the contested agreement belongs to. His argument began by recalling the well-known rule
established in previous case-law that the question of the applicable procedure for the
conclusion of an international agreement cannot be examined in isolation from the pre-
liminary question of determining the substantive legal basis of the agreement. Contrary
to the claims made by the Parliament, the AG concluded that in assessing whether or not
an agreement belongs exclusively under the CFSP, it is of little importance that the agree-
ment in question is also related, in a secondary manner, to areas than the CFSP. Such a
connection was therefore in sufficient to serve as the basis for consultation of or prior
consent from the Parliament required under Article 218(6) TFEU.11
The AG agreed with the Council that accepting the Parliament’s position would have
amounted to requiring the Parliament’s consent for many agreements founded solely on
a CFSP legal basis since such agreements often also have some connection with other
9 As a basis of this argumentation, the Council referred to the final sentence of Art. 24(1)(2) TEU and Art.
275 TFEU which (as a main rule) exclude the jurisdiction of the Court with respect to the CFSP provisions
of the TEU, with the exception of monitoring compliance with Art. 40 TFEU and reviewing the legality of
certain decisions as provided for under Art. 275(2) TFEU.
10 Opinion, para. 132.
11 Opinion, paras. 19 and 21.
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Union policies, given the existence of general, cross-cutting external relations objectives
and the requirement of consistency (in particular because of the well-recognised interrela-
tionship between security, development and human rights). He maintained that, due to
the horizontal objectives and the requirement of consistency in the Union’s external actions,
the presence of aspects relating to other Union policies, if they were incidental, did not
mean that the centre of gravity of the agreement was outside the CFSP.12
The AG also pointed out the importance of parallelism between internal and external
powers on which Article 218(6) TFEU was based. He agreed with the intervening states
that the interpretation advocated by the Parliament would have affected the institutional
balance established in the Treaty of Lisbon, which, as the AG added, would have meant
that the Parliament had greater powers in the adoption of a decision concerning the signing
and conclusion of an international agreement than it enjoyed with regard to the adoption
of an internal measure which had no such object.13
On the basis of the above consideration, the AG argued that both the context of the
agreement and its aim and content suggested that the appropriate substantive legal basis
for that decision is actually – and solely –Article 37 TEU. In accordance with the Council’s
argumentation, he also pointed out that both the contested decision and the Agreement
made reference to resolutions of the United Nations Security Council and to Council Joint
Action 2008/851/CFSP. Accordingly, there was a close link between the military operation
provided for by the Joint Action and the provisions on the transfer and treatment of sus-
pected pirates contained in the agreement. Such a link constituted a strong indication that
the agreement was connected with the CFSP.14
The imperative of security, to which both CFSP and the external dimension of the AFSJ
subscribe, was also highlighted in the opinion. This “common denominator” makes it
difficult to draw a clear distinction between the respective scopes of the two policies. The
AG saw, as decisive factors for making such a distinction, the borderline between the
internal and external elements of security.15 Based on this consideration, the AG argued
that since the contested Union action formed part of an action decided upon at an inter-
national level and which sought to combat a threat to international peace and security, the
action must have been adopted within the framework of the CFSP.16
12 Opinion, paras. 23-24.
13 Opinion, paras. 30-31.
14 Opinion, paras. 41, 44, 68 and 70.
15 Opinion, para. 112. This means, on the one hand, that the connection with the AFSJ is justified where there
is a direct link between the aim of the internal security of the Union and the judicial and/or police cooper-
ation which is developed outside the Union. On the other hand, a Union action must be connected with
the CFSP where the objective of that action is, first and foremost, peace, stability and democratic development
in a region outside the Union.
16 Opinion, op. cit., para. 114.
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As far as the scope of development policy is concerned, the AG did not follow the quite
extensive interpretation presented in earlier case-law.17 In his view, the assistance provided
for under the Agreement does not go beyond the objectives for which the Atalanta operation
was set up. Strengthening the judicial capacities of the Republic of Mauritius is not an end
in itself, but is aimed at the effective repression of acts of piracy which pose a threat to
international peace and security. Accordingly, its objective is certainly not the development
of the Republic of Mauritius and does therefore not constitute such a policy measure.18
Based on the above reasons, the AG concluded that recourse to another legal basis –
beyond Article 37 TEU – in the AFSJ provisions of the TFEU was not required. Nor did
the Agreement include a development cooperation component which may justify the
choice of an additional legal basis relating to that policy field. The adoption of the decision
concluding the contested agreement did not therefore require consent from or consultation
of the Parliament.19
27.4.2 Granting a Right to Be Informed to the Parliament in CFSP Matters
– Better Late Than Never
As to the Council’s submission regarding judicial review, the AG, in accordance with
established case-law, argued that – although the Court lacks jurisdiction in matters falling
within that policy – the CFSP did not completely escape the scrutiny of the European
Union judicature. Moreover, the exclusive CFSP legal basis of the contested measure did
not mean that the Court must decline to review whether the Council had complied with
the procedural rule provided for in Article 218(10) TFEU.20
As far as the alternative claim of the Council is concerned, the AG recalled the judgment
of the Court in the case Parliament v. Council stating that
participation by the Parliament in the legislative process is the reflection, at
Union level, of the fundamental democratic principle that the people should
participate in the exercise of power through the intermediary of a representative
assembly.
17 See for instance, Case C-91/05 Parliament v. Council, [2008] ECR I-3651, also known as the “ECOWAS”
judgment [see fn 35].
18 Opinion, op. cit., paras. 127 and 128.
19 Opinion, paras. 121, 122 and 131.
20 Opinion, paras. 136 and 138.
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At the same time, the AG pointed out, also on the basis of the case-law, that the framers
of the Treaty of Lisbon had made the choice to confer ‘a more limited role on the Parliament
with regard to the Union’s action under the CFSP’.21
As regards the Parliament’s right to be informed in the procedure of the conclusion of
international agreements, the AG also made a distinction between agreements which
exclusively relate to CFSP and those which do not. He considered that the Council could
legitimately be expected to provide the Parliament with information relating to an interna-
tional agreement more quickly and in fuller detail – so that it could give an informed
opinion –where the Parliament was required to give its consent or to be consulted pursuant
to Article 218(6)(2) TFEU than where consent from or consultation of the Parliament was
not necessary. The Court’s review of compliance by the Council with the information
obligation under Article 218(10) TFEU must therefore in each case have taken into account
the nature of the agreement in question and the Parliament’s powers under Article 218(6)
TFEU to influence the substantive content of that agreement.22
Accordingly, the AG established, on the one hand, that the Council had informed the
President of the Parliament directly and personally of the opening of negotiations, then
of the adoption of the contested decision and the signing of the Agreement. On the other
hand, he acknowledged that it would have been more in keeping with the spirit of Article
218(10) TFEU if the Parliament had been informed before the publication of the contested
decision and the Agreement in the Official Journal of the European Union. Finally, however,
he came to the conclusion that the conditions for establishing a violation of Article 218(10)
TFEU were not given, since the Agreement related exclusively to the CFSP, and the period
of three months which had elapsed before informing the Parliament had neither infringed
the latter’s prerogatives, nor could it have influenced the content of the Agreement.23
27.5 The Judgment of the Court: The People Win the Second Game
27.5.1 Parallel Internal and External Institutional Powers
Not surprisingly, the Court began its reasoning in relation to the first plea by recalling the
“centre of gravity” test. Unlike the AG, it did not go into further detail about the demarca-
tion between the areas of CFSP and other EU policies. Instead, the Court went on to search
for those common points in which there was an agreement between the parties. In doing
so, it established that the Parliament expressly recognised that the decision and the EU-
21 Opinion, para. 140.
22 Opinion, paras. 142-143.
23 Opinion, paras. 155 and 157.
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Mauritius Agreement pursue as their main aim that which fell within the CFSP and to
which the other objectives of the agreement – notwithstanding their importance – were
only incidental.24
Based on this observation, the Court continued by investigating whether the undisputed,
exclusively CFSP legal basis entails the exclusivity of this policy in the sense of Article
218(6) TFEU. Although it acknowledged that the primarily CFSP aim of the contested
agreement did not automatically mean that it was related ‘exclusively to the [CFSP]’,25 it
also invoked the principle of parallelism, by arguing that Article 218(6) TFEU established
symmetry between the procedure for adopting EU measures internally and the procedure
for adopting international agreements in order to guarantee that the Parliament and the
Council enjoyed the same powers in relation to a given field, in compliance with the
institutional balance provided for by the Treaties. Such a requirement of symmetry also
meant that the rule identified by case-law – that is the substantive legal basis of a measure
which determines the procedures to be followed in adopting that measure – applied not
only to internal law-making but also to the conclusion of international agreements.
Therefore, where the decision concluding the agreement in question was legitimately
founded exclusively on a substantive legal basis falling within the CFSP, the type of proce-
dure provided for in the first part of Article 218(6)(2) TFEU applied which did not require
the consent or consultation of the Parliament. Such an interpretation was justified, partic-
ularly in the light of requirements relating to legal certainty. The interpretation advocated
by the Parliament, the Court argued, would have had the effect of introducing a degree of
uncertainty and inconsistency into that choice, in so far as it would have been liable to
result in the application of different procedures to acts of EU law which had the same
substantive legal basis.26
The Court gave an affirmative answer to the question of its jurisdiction to rule on the
second plea, by arguing – not surprisingly and in accordance with earlier case-law27 – that
the scope of the limitation on its jurisdiction envisaged in the final sentence of Article
24(1)(2) TEU and in Article 275 TFEU did not preclude the Court from having jurisdiction
to interpret and apply a provision such as Article 218 TFEU which “does not fall within
the CFSP, even though it lays down the procedure on the basis of which an act falling
within the CFSP has been adopted.”28
24 Judgment, paras. 44-45.
25 Judgment, para. 50.
26 Judgment, paras. 56, 57, 59, 60 and 62.
27 See in particular the broad interpretation on the scope of the Court’s jurisdiction to monitor compliance
with Art. 40 (ex-Art. 47) TEU in cases C-170/03 Commission v. Council [1998] ECR I-2763, paras. 13-18;
ECOWAS, op. cit., para. 31-34.
28 Judgment, para. 73.
457
27 The External Side of Parliamentary Democracy
27.5.2 Parliamentary Right to Be Informed in EU Treaty-Making – No
Differences between Policies
As regards the merits of the second plea, the Court did not confirm the AG’s conclusion.
It held that the Parliament had not been immediately informed at all stages of the procedure
for negotiating and concluding the EU-Mauritius Agreement, since the Council had not
informed it on the adoption of the contested decision and the signing of that agreement
until three months later and 17 days after their publication in the OJ.29
The Court continued by stressing that
the information requirement arising under Article 218(10) TFEU is prescribed
in order to ensure that the Parliament is in a position to exercise democratic
scrutiny of the European Union’s external action…30
That rule is an expression of the democratic principles on which the European Union was
founded and may not be fulfilled through official publication, since the latter satisfies
another requirement, i.e. publicity requirements to which an EU act is subject if it is to
enter into force. The Treaty of Lisbon had even enhanced the importance of said rule in
the treaty system by inserting it in a separate provision within Article 218 TFEU. The
information requirement laid down in Paragraph (10) applies, therefore, to any procedure
for concluding an international agreement, including agreements relating exclusively to
the CFSP. Finally, on the basis of the above reasons, the Court found the second plea to
be well founded and annulled the contested decision.31
27.6 Comment
The constitutional significance of the case is beyond doubt. With the recognition of the
Parliament’s right to be informed in the procedure of concluding CFSP related international
agreements the Court opened a door for the institution which had previously remained
closed for so long and been heavily guarded by the shield of national sovereignty. At the
same time, certain parts of the reasoning and the outcome of the judgment raise further
questions which call for a more detailed analysis. This is particularly the case in light of
the relevant modifications of the EU constitutional order brought about by the Lisbon
treaty.
29 Judgment, paras. 76 and 77.
30 Judgment, para. 79.
31 Judgment, paras. 79, 82, 87.
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27.6.1 Abolition of the EU Pillar System by the Lisbon Treaty – What Are
the Consequences?
In the pre-Lisbon period, the task of identifying the appropriate legal basis was further
complicated by the Union’s “pillar structure”.32 It soon became obvious, in particular fol-
lowing the ECOWAS (also known as “Small arms and light weapon”) judgment, that a
watertight separation of the different EU policy fields was not feasible.33 In the spirit of
“clarity, consistency and rationalisation”, the Treaty of Lisbon abolished the former pillar
system of the EU; however, the results of this modification are not self-evident. AG Bot
also began his Opinion by establishing that
This case nevertheless demonstrates once again34 […] that despite the formal
disappearance of the pillars the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon has not
obviated the need to delimit the respective scopes of the Union’s different
policies.35
The above statement is particularly true where the contested EU measure – be it an internal
action or an international agreement to be concluded with third parties – concerns both
CFSP objectives and other EU policies at the same time, since the main characteristics of
the former were retained, even after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. The limited
role of the Parliament in decision-making procedures is also an important piece of the
‘CFSP picture’. A de facto dichotomy between EU (CFSP) measures and acquis communau-
taire can therefore still be discerned, and the latter so frequently cited category remains
obscure.36 As Herlin-Karnell remarked, “there is consequently reason to believe that the
[…] Treaty adds to rather than resolves the many constitutional complexities within the
CFSP area.”37
The present case, in which the Court for the first time interpreted the parliamentary
involvement in the procedure for the conclusion of a CFSP related international agreement
definitely affirmed the above claims. It has become clear (in particular when reading the
AG’s argumentation) that it is not merely the delimitation of respective policy aims that
32 For a detailed analysis in this regard, see: Joni Heliskoski, ‘Small Arms and Light Weapons within the
Union’s Pillar Structure: An Analysis of Art. 47 of the EU Treaty’, European Law Review 33, 2008, p. 899.
33 Hillion, Christophe and Wessel, Ramses A., ‘Competence Distribution in EU External Relations after
ECOWAS: Clarification or Continued Fuzziness?’, Common Market Law Review 46, 2009, p. 551.
34 A reference was made here to the judgment in C-130/10 Parliament v. Council, EU:C:2012:472 which, as
we will see below, concerned the fight against international terrorism.
35 Opinion, op. cit., para. 2.
36 The nature of the ‘Acquis Communautaire’ was defined this way by S. Weatherill, ‘Safeguarding the Acquis
Communautaire’, in: T. Heukles et al. (Eds.), The European Union after Amsterdam, The Hague: Kluwer,
1998, p. 153.
37 Herlin-Karnell, op. cit., p. 1002.
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is questionable, but additional problems may also arise. Here, the Court had to face further
challenges – such as the close connection between the contested agreement and the Joint
Action; the overlapping scopes of the general horizontal aims of EU external actions (which
are all CFSP objectives without further specification) and particular policy-related ones;
as well as the not so obvious differences between the internal and external sides of security
– in ascertaining the policy field whose objectives the contested agreement pursues.
This case also justifies an observation that there is a difference in the approaches outlined
in the Court’s decisions before and after 1 December 2009. While the rulings delivered
(ever since the failure of the Constitutional Treaty in 2005 and before the entry into force
of the Treaty of Lisbon) show that the Court has subscribed to a depillarisation trend (at
least in the relation between the old First and Third Pillars),38 in the post-Lisbon judgments
– that is, after (!) the de facto abolition of the pillar-structure –, it seems to have taken a
step backwards, by stressing the characteristics of decision-making in the field of CFSP,
at least as far as the Parliament’s rights are concerned.
27.6.2 Parallelism between Internal and External Actions – Does the Implied
Power Doctrine Really Work for Institutional Powers?
As regards the conclusion of international agreements between the EU and third parties,
the Treaty of Lisbon extended the Parliament’s right to consent to all areas in which the
EP has the power of co-decision under the ordinary legislative procedure (Art. 218 TFEU).
In practice, this means that the EP acquired the capacity to ratify international agreements
in key areas such as trade, agriculture and internal security matters – areas from which it
had previously been excluded.39
The aim of such an extension of parliamentary power, as the Court explained, is to
establish a symmetry between internal and external EU actions and the Court based, in
essence, its conclusion concerning the first plea on this consideration.
Emphasising the parallelism (symmetry) of internal and external parliamentary powers
is important, particularly when we look back to the evolution of the rights of institution
in the process of European integration from a broader perspective. History shows that
while the Parliament was afforded an ever greater role in internal decision-making through
the introduction and extension of the co-decision procedure to more and more policy
fields, the procedure for the conclusion of international agreements persistently maintained
the respective prerogatives of the Commission and the Council.40 This is not surprising,
38 Herlin-Karnell, op. cit., p. 1003.
39 Ariadna Ripoll Servent, ‘The role of the European Parliament in international negotiations after Lisbon’,
Journal of European Public Policy 21, 2014, p. 568.
40 Daniel Thym, ‘Parliamentary Involvement in European International Relations’, in: Marise Cremona –
Bruno de Witte (Eds.), EU Foreign Relations Law: Constitutional Fundamentals, Oxford: Hart, 2008, p. 201.
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since the involvement in “external”decision-making (due to substantive differences between
domestic and foreign policies41), traditionally remains beyond the reach of democratically
elected parliaments also in national constitutional orders.42 Viewed from this angle, the
still (i.e. in the post-Lisbon period) limited role of the Parliament in CFSP decision-making
(including the treaty-making procedure) is a logical consequence of the specific features
of foreign affairs.43
All these factors can explain why the Parliament, despite its clear efforts to acquire
more extensive powers in international affairs,44 remained an outsider to the ‘club’ in
charge of the external governance of the EU, pending the entry into force of the Lisbon
Treaty. The implied power doctrine as applied by the Court for delimiting the treaty-
making competences of the Community (as a whole) and according to which “the system
of internal […] measures may not […] be separated from that of external relations” has
not been extended to the institutional rules governing the exercise of powers in pre-Lisbon
case-law.45
Returning now to the requirement for symmetry between internal and external parlia-
mentary powers, it is apparent that the Court regarded the proper determination of legal
basis (viewed through the lens of the “centre of gravity test”) as one of the main instruments
for ensuring such a parallelism. A direct linkage between the parallelism of institutional
prerogatives and legal basis is not, however, in every case so obvious as the Court claims
it to be in the present case, since the aims of the internal and external activities of the EU
in a given policy field are not necessarily the same and the external instruments may often
be more complex (which, in the author’s view, is also manifest in the present case).46
Furthermore, the link between parallelism and legal basis as interpreted by the Court
in its reasoning regarding the first plea also appears to be problematic in the light of the
implied powers case-law. Related decisions essentially focus on whether the conclusion of
an agreement by Member States (and not the EU) affects internal EU rules. As to determin-
ing whether the EU has implied external powers or not, the Court expressly excluded the
applicability of the centre of gravity test:
41 Following Thym’s approach (Thym, op. cit., pp. 201-202), foreign policy can be seen as predominantly
governed by executive bodies and as being generally less about legal rule-making for a political community
and much more about requiring political positioning towards third international parti(es), identification
of strategic goals as well as flexibility in adaptation of methods for its realisation and implementation.
42 Thym, op. cit., p. 201.
43 Peter Van Elsuwege, ‘EU External Action after the Collapse of the Pillar Structure: In Search of a New Balance
Between Delimitation and Consistency’, Common Market Law Review 47, 2010, p. 999.
44 In detail, see: Thym, op. cit., pp. 203-210.
45 Thym, op. cit., p. 202.
46 This consideration will be further elaborated below (section 27.6.4).
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the legal basis for the Community rules […] are, in themselves, irrelevant in
determining whether an international agreement affects Community rules: the
legal basis of internal legislation is determined by its principal component,
whereas the rule which may possibly be affected may be merely an ancillary
component of that legislation. The purpose of the exclusive competence of the
Community is primarily to preserve the effectiveness of Community law and
the proper functioning of the systems established by its rules, independently
of any limits laid down by the provision of the Treaty on which the institutions
base the adoption of such rules.47
Such an approach was amenable to a rather extensive interpretation of the scope of EU
implied external powers, which is to some extent independent of the legal basis of internal
rules adopted in a given policy field. If the treaty-making power of the EU (as a whole)
maybe interpreted in this way, why can the Parliament’s “treaty-making rights” not be
approached in a similarly flexible and less legal basis oriented manner? A combined result
of the process in fact makes the people the loser of the competence-game: the broad
interpretation of the EU’s exclusive treaty-making power deprives national assemblies of
the right to take part in control-mechanisms which would be possible under the procedure
for concluding mixed agreements,48 whereas the prerogatives of the EP are strictly inter-
preted where the EU exercises its exclusive treaty-making power. On the one hand, a less
flexible interpretation of the Parliament’s prerogatives can definitely be traced back to (as
previously explained) the traditional limited parliamentary involvement in foreign affairs.
On the other hand, there may also be an argument for a more extensive approach, in par-
ticular in light of pre-Lisbon case-law and recent tendencies in EU treaty-making practice,
as will be detailed below.
27.6.3 Determination of the Substantive Legal Basis of EU Norms – The People
versus the Centre of Gravity Test
The argumentation of the Court concerning the first plea does not fully match the spirit
of earlier case-law, although the above conclusion can certainly be explained by the prin-
ciple of legal certainty and thus by a formalistic “legal basis focused” argumentation.
However, having regard in particular to the principle of democratic participation high-
lighted in earlier case-law, it may also be argued that the Court could have found a solution
47 Opinion 1/03 Competence of the Community to conclude the new Lugano Convention on jurisdiction and
the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters [2006] ECR I-1145.
48 For a more detailed analysis of this mechanism, see: Thym, op. cit., p. 213; Angéla Juhász-Tóth, ‘The
Europeanization of the Hungarian National Assembly’ (PhD thesis, Debrecen, 2014) p. 58.
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which ensures a stronger role for the Parliament in the procedure (that is the right to be
consulted) but, at the same time, does not impinge upon the requirements arising from
legal certainty. At this point, it is worth analysing this issue more deeply.
Looking back to early jurisprudence, in the Titanium-Dioxide judgment delivered in
1991, the Court seemed to be more receptive to the importance of democratic participation
in the decision-making procedure, than in our times, in 2014. It annulled the contested
regulation of the Council which was based on two relevant provisions of the Treaty instead
of one. Although the use of both enabling provisions had not been excluded in earlier case-
law,49 the Court found that it was not applicable in the present Parliament v. Council case,
since the joint legal basis would have divested the cooperation procedure of its very sub-
stance50 as the weight of the amendments to the Council’s common position proposed by
the Parliament would have been lost.51 Such an interpretation has been confirmed by
subsequent rulings, pointing out that “recourse to a dual legal basis is not possible where
[…] the use of two legal bases is liable to undermine the rights of the Parliament”.52
It is further worth recalling the Kadi case. Although the policy-classification of the
contested measure was not the focus here, the approach to the issue of legal basis applied
by the Court of First Instance (CFI, now General Court) and, in essence, confirmed by the
Court of Justice, is quite interesting. In comparison with the present case, a much more
flexible attitude was demonstrated, since the CFI found that “recourse to the cumulative
legal bases [i.e. ex-Articles 60 EC, 301 EC and 308 EC] makes it possible to attain, in the
sphere of economic and financial sanctions, the objective pursued under the CFSP by the
Union and its Member States […] despite the lack of any express attribution to the Com-
munity of powers to impose economic and financial sanctions on individuals or entities
with no sufficient connection to a given third country […]”. Instead of emphasising the
limited powers of the EU institution in CFSP and the unique character of the (ex-)second
pillar, the Court stated that the contested “action by the Community is […] in actual fact
action by the Union” and that “account has to be taken of the bridge […] between Com-
49 See, inter alia, the judgment delivered in Case 165/87 Commission v. Council, [1988] ECR 5545, para. 11,
in which the Court held that “where an institution’s power is based on two provisions of the Treaty, it is
bound to adopt the relevant measures on the basis of the two relevant provisions.”
50 Under the cooperation procedure, the Council acts by a qualified majority where it intends to accept
amendments to its common position proposed by the Parliament and included by the Commission in its
re-examined proposal, whereas it must secure unanimity if it intends to take a decision after its common
position has been rejected by the Parliament or if it intends to modify the Commission’s re-examined pro-
posal. As a result of simultaneous reference to Arts. 100a and 130s, the Council was required, in any event,
to act unanimously.
51 One of the provisions at issue (ex-Art. 100 EC) foresaw recourse to the cooperation procedure, whereas
the other (ex-Art. 130s EC) required the Council to act unanimously after merely consulting the Parliament.
52 See C-178/03, para. 57. See also Joined Cases C-164/97 and C-165/97 Parliament v. Council [1999] ECR I-
1139, para. 14; and Case C-338/01 Commission v. Council, [2004] ECR I-4829, para. 57.
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munity actions imposing economic sanctions […] and CFSP objectives.”53 Nor did the
CFI consider the multiplication of legal bases here to be problematic. On appeal against
the CFI’s judgment, the Court of Justice further pointed out that
adding Article 308 EC to the legal basis of the contested regulation enabled the
European Parliament to take part in the decision-making process relating to
the measures at issue which are specifically aimed at individuals whereas, under
Articles 60 EC and 301 EC, no role is provided for that institution.54
Taking the Titanium-Dioxide and the Kadi rulings together, there is one common point:
the “principle of conferral”,55 which lies at the heart of the strictly legal basis focused
arguments, has not been at the forefront of the reasoning. The Court(s) laid more
emphasis – and in both cases in favour of the Parliament – on other fundamental principles,
such as “the peoples should take part in the exercise of power through the intermediary
of a representative assembly” or the implementation of effective instruments to ensure
international peace and security.
The ECOWAS case offered the first opportunity for the Court to examine a legal basis
conflict between the ex-first and ex-second pillar. The case made it clear that in such a
context the centre of gravity doctrine is difficult to apply.56 The Court found the contested
decision to be unlawful and in breach of ex-Article 47 (now 40) TEU since it was adopted
exclusively on the basis of the CFSP provision of the EU Treaty, whereas, for falling both
within EC development cooperation policy and CFSP, it had been founded on the EC legal
basis relating to the former policy. In comparison with our judgment, a more “Community-
friendly” (which also means, in our view, Parliament-friendly57) approach was demonstrated
here. Firstly, because the judgment suggests that if the measure is both about EC and CFSP
53 Cases T-306/01, Ahmed Ali Yusuf and Al Barakaat International Foundation v. Council and Commission
[2005] ECR II-3353; and T-315/01, Yassin Abdullah Kadi v. Council and Commission, [2005] ECR II-3649,
paras. 159-161. It should, however, be noted that the Court of Justice held, on appeal in Kadi, that such a
view runs counter to the very wording of ex-Art. 308 TEC and, in relation to ex-Arts. 60 and 301 TEC, only
found the above statement correct in case the text expressly referred to a connection between CFSP objectives
and economic sanctions of the EC. Nevertheless, the Court also established that the former article (together
with the other two provisions) could legitimately be regarded an appropriate foundation for the contested
regulation which is also linked to the operation of the common market within the meaning of Art. 308 TEC.
(See Joined Cases C-402 & 415/05 P, Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v. Council and Com-
mission, [2008] ECR I-6351.)
54 C-402 & 415/05 P, op. cit., para. 235.
55 See Art. 5(1) TEU: “The limits of Union competences are governed by the principle of conferral.” and Art.
4(1) TEU: “… competences not conferred upon the Union in the Treaties remain with the Member States.”
56 Hillion and Wessel, op. cit., p. 576.
57 In the area of development cooperation the ex-Art. 179(1) TEC provided that ‘the measures necessary to
further the objectives referred to in ex-Art. 177 [TEC]’ are to be adopted by the Council acting in accordance
with the so-called co-decision [after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty ordinary legislative] procedure.’
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matters, without one being incidental to the other, the EC legal basis wins.58 Secondly, the
Court clearly gave a broader interpretation to the scope of development cooperation policy.59
Contrary to the ECOWAS cases, ex-Article 47 TEU was not invoked in the present
case, neither by the parties, nor by the Court,60 although the provision reborn as a “mutual
non-affectation clause”61 in the current Article 40 TEU is definitely capable of safeguarding
the immunity of the CFSP area. While Article 47 TEU62 had a pre-emptive effect on EU
external action in favour of the Community, the new Article 4063 not only protects the
acquis communautaire, but also the “CFSP acquis”, both in terms of procedure and powers.64
It would be an exaggeration to say that there is an obvious contradiction between the
previous case-law and the present judgment, but, as far as the pillars of the Court’s reasoning
are concerned, a shift from highlighting the need for democratic scrutiny to emphasising
the inviolability of the “centre of gravity” test is evident. The present ruling is not the first
one in this new line of cases. Indeed, in a recent post-Lisbon Parliament v. Council case
where, similarly to Kadi, the legal basis of the EU regulation imposing – in the name of
combating terrorism – economic sanctions against individuals was contested, the Court
argued that
while it is true that choosing between Articles 75 TFEU65 and 215 TFEU66 as
the legal basis for the contested regulation has consequences for the Parliament’s
prerogatives, inasmuch as the former provides for recourse to the ordinary
legislative procedure whereas, under the latter, the Parliament is merely
informed, that fact cannot, however, determine the choice of legal basis.67
58 Hillion and Wessel, op. cit., p. 574.
59 See, in particular, para. 94 of the judgment: “…it cannot be inferred from the contested decision that in
comparison with its objectives of preserving peace and strengthening international security its concern to
eliminate or reduce obstacles to the development of the countries concerned is purely incidental.”
60 Only the AG and the Kingdom of Sweden as well as the United Kingdom as interveners made a short refer-
ence to Art. 40 TEU to support their basically ‘pro-CFSP’ arguments.
61 A term borrowed from Elsuwege, op. cit., p. 988 and p. 1002.
62 “…nothing in [the TEU] shall affect the Treaties establishing the European Communities.”
63 “The implementation of the [CFSP] shall not affect the application of the procedures and the extent of the
powers of the institutions laid down by the Treaties for the exercise of the Union competences referred to
in Arts. 3 to 6 of the [TFEU]. Similarly, the implementation of the policies listed in those Articles shall not
affect the application of the procedures and the extent of the powers of the institutions laid down by the Treaties
for the exercise of the Union competences under [the CFSP] Chapter.” [Emphasis added].
64 Hillion and Wessel, op. cit., pp. 582-583.
65 Ex-Art. 60 TEC. As we can see, an important difference between the old and the new version is that the
former Art. 60 provides no role for the Parliament whereas the reformulated text enables the institution to
take part in the decision-making process.
66 Ex-Art. 301 TEC.
67 C-130/10, op. cit., para. 79. [Emphasis added].
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It is apparent that such an approach is rather far removed from the spirit of the Titanium-
Dioxide reasoning. Nor was the Court convinced by the argument that “it would be contrary
to Union law for it to be possible for measures to be adopted that impinge directly on the
fundamental rights of individuals and groups by means of a procedure excluding the Par-
liament’s participation” and it bluntly rejected the Parliament’s claim by arguing that “the
duty to respect fundamental rights is imposed, in accordance with Article 51(1) of the
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, on all the institutions and bodies
of the Union” and “the acts referred to in [Article 75 TFEU and Article 215(3) TFEU] are
to include necessary provisions on legal safeguards.”
The message of the pre-Lisbon case-law for us is that ensuring the Parliament’s
involvement in decision-making procedures can be a legitimate influential factor in
determining the legal basis of EU acts. The Titanium-Dioxide judgment, for instance, made
it clear that the choice of dual basis must be sacrificed in order to guarantee the full protec-
tion of parliamentary prerogatives in decision-making, even if the contested EU measure
(simultaneously) has aims or components falling within two EU policy fields, such that it
should have been founded on two Treaty provisions. Hence, the question arises as to why
such an interpretation does not work conversely? Especially when we take into consideration
the general policy objectives behind the Lisbon Treaty reforms concerning EU external
relations68 and the fact that the pillar system has (at least formally) been abolished by
1 December 2009.69 More specifically, if the measure at stake can be founded on a single
legal basis (now Article 37 TEU) but definitely has (even if only incidentally) aims other
than those falling within the CFSP, why have the parliamentary rights other than that to
be informed, been so categorically excluded,70 whilst the treaty text itself does not make
such an explicit exception in the case of “non-exclusively” but only predominantly CFSP
related agreements? The present judgment left a lacunae by not clarifying the controversy
that the textual interpretation of Article 218(6) TFEU does not obviously allow for only
one reading of that provision; that is, all the treaties concluded by the EU solely on the
substantive legal basis provided by Article 37 TEU must be regarded as an agreement
68 The intention to establish the basis for a more integrated and coherent EU external action is also expressed
in the attribution of a single legal personality to the Union (Art. 47 TEU), as well as in the common set of
objectives for the EU external actions under Art. 21(1) TEU. For a supporting opinion see inter alia Louis,
Jean-Victor, ‘The European Union: from External Relations to Foreign Policy?’, EU Diplomacy Papers 2,
2007, p. 4.
69 Nevertheless, it is also important to mention the ‘pre-Lisbon cases’ (such as the ECOWAS case discussed
above) here where cross-pillar measures have been challenged (which was not the issue of the Titanium-
Dioxide and Kadi cases) and where the Court refused to accept a dual legal basis because of the fundamental
differences between the supranational and intergovernmental methods of cooperation. This is one aspect
why the abolishment of the pillar system is (or at least could be) so important for cases where the Court
should determine the legal basis of (non-exclusively) CFSP instruments.
70 As we have seen, the Court failed to acknowledge the need for both the consent and the consultation of the
Parliament (see para. 52 of the judgment cited above).
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relating exclusively to CFSP. The “exclusively” in the text relates only to the link between
the given contested measure and the policy area, but has not been connected to a legal
basis issue. In this regard, Article 218(6) TFEU diverges from Article 207 TFEU (CCP)
which expressly provides for a special procedure for the conclusion of agreements falling
within the scope of this provision.
A more extensive interpretation of the scope of parliamentary prerogatives would also
be feasible by taking into account the increasingly complex nature of CFSP agreements.
It can generally be established that, because of this complexity, the “incidental” character
of a non-CFSP aim pursued by an agreement ever less evidently justifies the conclusion
that such an agreement can only regulate CFSP issues which, by their very nature, do not
require parliamentary control. On the contrary, aspects concerning the particular rights
of individuals are often integrated into such “clear” CFSP agreements. AG Bot expressly
referred to the well-recognised interrelationship between security, development and human
rights, which, as he recognized “means that it would very often be possible to argue that
measures taken in one of these three areas will also have some effect on the other two areas
[…] for the purposes of the application of Article 218(6) TFEU”. Interestingly, this reasoning
was intended to support the final conclusion of the AG that the contested agreement did
not require consent from or consultation of the Parliament. However, the ‘weapon’ he
used may also be turned against him: even the tendency that the content of such agreements
has become ever so complex (and ever so focused on the individual) calls for a more flexible
approach from the Court to legal basis issues. The question therefore arises as to whether
the consistent application of the rigid ‘centre of gravity’ test is reasonable. At this point it
is worth recalling the paper of Hillion and Wessel, published in 2009, which already
anticipated certain problems with the above test in a cross-pillar dimension after Lisbon.
The authors established that
in adjudicating on “cross-sector” legal basis, the Court could […] build upon
the EC legal basis case law, whereby a possible greater role of the European
Parliament in the decision-making has become one factor that may be relevant
for choosing a specific legal basis of an act….71
The new list of comprehensive horizontal aims guiding all areas of EU external action
introduced by the Lisbon Treaty, when read together with Articles 23 and 24 TEU, com-
plicates determining the legal basis even further. The former provision only refers to the
horizontal objectives laid down in Article 21(2) TEU, and the latter provides a particularly
71 Hillion and Wessel, op. cit., p. 581 [emphasis added].
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broad and general definition of the CFSP.72 There is thus an absence of specific CFSP
objectives which also makes the centre of gravity test difficult to apply.73 Against this
background, an inflexible approach to legal basis disputes seems to be even more problem-
atic. The question is challenging, in particular, from the perspective of human rights pro-
tection which is increasingly becoming a priority objective of all policies pertaining to EU
external action.74 In light of the above, the Council’s submission that the promotion of
human rights protection in third countries is an objective that falls within the CFSP and
therefore the CFSP legal basis – granting less parliamentary rights in the procedure – is
justified, is far from convincing. A more persuasive argument is
…if there is any ambiguity about the choice between possible legal bases or
decision-making processes, the Court should ensure that EU measures concern-
ing human rights should be decided by means of whichever process ensures
the maximum possible parliamentary input and judicial control.75
The need for guarantees of human rights protection outside the EU justifies even more
the above formulated search for a new approach to the centre of gravity test, at least where
the Parliament’s prerogatives in the procedure of the conclusion of international agreements
are at stake.
27.6.4 How Parliamentary Prerogatives Really Work in the Procedure for the
Conclusion of International Agreements
The possible length of the procedure or difficulties in bringing about a consensus between
the participating actors as a determining factor of an actor’s involvement naturally remains
outside the scope of legal reasoning handed down by the Court in the present case. Never-
theless, it is worth examining the practical impact of the Lisbon reforms in more detail in
72 Under that provision, ‘[t]he Union’s competence in matters of [the CFSP] shall cover all areas of foreign
policy and all questions relating to the Union’s security, including the progressive framing of a common
defence policy that might lead to a common defence’.
73 Elsuwege, op. cit., p. 1004. The AG also pointed out this difficulty in the present case and – in order to be
able to define the boundaries between the CFSP and the Union’s other policies – invoked ex-Art. 11(1)
TEU, as the provision containing the ‘original’ CFSP objectives to which (current) Art. 21(2)(a) to (c) and
(h) TEU correspond to.
74 See in particular ‘EU Strategic Framework on Human Rights and Democracy’ adopted by the Council in
2012 (11855/12); available at: www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/press-
data/EN/foraff/131181.pdf.
75 In this context, Peers also referred to the significance of the elevation of the EU Charter of Fundamental
Rights to the ‘same legal value’ as the Treaties (Art. 6 TEU). Steve Peers, ‘Pirates of the Indian Ocean: Legal
Base and Democratic Debate’; 30 January 2014, available at: http://eulawanaly-
sis.blogspot.co.uk/2014/01/pirates-of-indian-ocean-legal-base-and.html#more.
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order to estimate not only the constitutional but also the practical significance of the present
judgement, as well as to try and comprehend the Council’s passivity.
The EU–US SWIFT Agreement was the first to be subjected to ratification by the EP
after 1 December 2009.76 The objective of the Agreement is to manage the access of US
authorities to personal bank data contained in the servers of the Belgian SWIFT company.
As the Member States considered the EP’s ratification a formality, they were rather surprised
when, on 11 February 2010, the Parliament decided to vote against the ratification of the
agreement, since it did found the level of data protection granted by the agreement to be
insufficient. At the same time, the Council and the US party (in agreement) shared a dif-
ferent understanding of the substantive problem and preferred a pull system,77 which gave
them more freedom to analyse bulk data and find useful leads in their fight against terror-
ism.78 In the end, the actors of the procedure renegotiated the agreement satisfying the
Parliament to ratify it. However, it was necessary to put several strategies into place to
consider the EP’s interests and to achieve such a positive result.79
It also became apparent that the EP intended to effectively exercise its new power of
consent (and not only formally, as was expected by the Council and the US). Other partic-
ipants of the procedure therefore needed to change their strategy – this was evident from
previous experience. After the signing of the first rejected interim agreement, the others
made ‘last-minute’ attempts to put pressure on the EP, which, as we know, failed to prevent
parliamentary rejection. The defeat of the first effort to conclude the SWIFT-agreement
led the actors to use their persuasive instruments and to search for a consensus with the
EP right from the agenda-setting stage.80 Just to mention one important result of this atti-
tude, the negotiating directives of the Council openly referred to the specific objectives set
out in the recommendations made by the European Parliament in its Resolution of 5 May
201081 as those to be achieved by the Commission in the course of negotiations. Therefore,
the Commission’s actions were de facto not only guided by the Council’s mandate – as
foreseen in the Lisbon Treaty – but also by the EP resolution.82
76 To be more precise, this second round of negotiations was the first to occur fully under the Treaty of Lisbon.
77 In the ‘pull’ system (in contrast with the ‘push’ system), the data transmission is initiated by the recipient,
which means, in the present context, direct access by US authorities to European bank data bases.
78 Servent, op. cit., pp. 9-10.
79 Servent, op. cit., p. 11. The Commission, among other efforts, offered increased data protection safeguards
in the new negotiating mandate; the Presidency sent an EU official to the US for the purpose of overseeing
the use of European SWIFT data; the US invited key MEPs to visit the US.
80 This stage is identified following Servent, who distinguished three stages within the procedure for conclusion
of international agreements, these being agenda-setting; negotiation; and ratification [Servent, op. cit., pp.
571-577].
81 P7_TA(2010)0143.
82 Servent, op. cit., p. 578.
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The subsequent practice of the conclusion of international agreements shows that such
a development of the Parliament’s role from a veto-maker to an agenda-setter83 became
more and more accepted and formalized.84 Against this background, the outcome of the
present judgment may have two different readings and a twofold significance. At first sight
– and from a formal legal perspective – the recent decision of the Court may be considered
yet another reinforcement of the principle of legal certainty, through applying a simple
formula that the rights of the institutions in – either internal or internationally oriented
– decision-making are strictly limited by the legal basis of the contested measure. However,
beyond the surface, the political weight of the ruling seems to be much stronger. The present
action of the Parliament may also be seen as an additional attempt to exploit the possibilities
offered by the ambiguous Treaty-text to strengthen, by way of (the Court’s) interpretation,
the Parliament’s role in the whole process of concluding international agreements. The
Court, however, plays (yet again)85 a braking role in the game played by the Council, the
Parliament, and the Commission/HR (and eventually other participants), by rejecting the
first plea and thereby delivering a message that the Parliament cannot go further down
the road of increasing its involvement in such procedures, at least in the case of CFSP
related agreements. In doing so, the Court, although without making any express reference
on it, interpreted the principle of institutional balance in a similar way as the intervening
states (in support of the Council) advocated in the present case.86
At the same time, the exact scope of the judgment’s ‘braking effect’ is not obvious,
particularly in light of the affirmative response given to the second plea, as the borderline
between the parliamentary prerogatives granted by Article 218(6) on the one hand, and
Article 218(10) TFEU on the other, does not seem to be clear. This undefined relationship
led to an ‘institutional uncertainty’ following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty,
which the Parliament used to successfully reinterpret its right to be ‘informed’ in interna-
tional negotiations and transformed it into a right to be ‘involved’.87 A remarkable stage
of such a transformation process is the Framework Agreement of 2010 made between the
EP and the Commission, which foresees that
the information [pursuant to Article 218(10) TFEU] shall be provided to Par-
liament in sufficient time for it to be able to express its point of view if appro-
83 Expressions borrowed from Servent, op. cit., pp. 581 and 582.
84 See, for instance, the EP’s view as formulated in an EP recommendation: “[the EP] takes the view that ade-
quate transparency has not been ensured throughout the negotiations on ACTA; recognises that efforts to
inform Parliament have been undertaken by the Commission, but regrets that the requirement of trans-
parency has been construed very narrowly and only as a result of pressure by Parliament and civil society.”
85 See, for instance, the judgment of the Court delivered in Case C-130/10 Parliament v. Council, op. cit.
86 See the argumentation of Sweden and the United Kingdom in Section 27.3 above.
87 Servent, op. cit., p. 580.
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priate, and for the Commission to be able to take Parliament’s views as far as
possible into account.88
Arguably, the right to be informed granted by this provision is equal, regardless of the
policy field to which the contested measure pertains. Viewed from this angle, the Court’s
conclusion outlined above seems to be much more convincing than the artificial distinction
made by the AG between agreements which exclusively relate to CFSP and those which
do not.(And the Council’s argumentation is even less persuasive in this regard, in which
the reference to the ‘summer break’ sounds rather ironic.89) What is more, as Peers argues,
Article 218(10) can also be read as suggesting that the EP should have more information,
not less as regards CFSP treaties than the others, which the EP can veto on the basis of
Article 218(6), whereas the content of CFSP treaties can only influenced by the EP before
their signing and conclusion.90
27.6.5 Looking behind the Curtain: The High Representative in the Present
Procedure
The Framework Agreement mentioned above also provides that
Parliament shall be immediately and fully informed at all stages of the negotia-
tion and conclusion of international agreements, including the definition of
negotiating directives. The Commission shall act in a manner to give full effect
to its obligations pursuant to Article 218 TFEU….91
In the present case, however, as the contested measure relates to CFSP, it is not the Com-
mission but the High Representative of the CFSP who is in charge of conducting the
negotiations, and thus providing the EP with information at this stage. The relation between
the Framework Agreement and the HR’s tasks is not self-evident, as she is/was92 de facto
a vice-president of the Commission, but, as regards CFSP matters, does not act on behalf
of the latter institution.93 At the same time, the HR committed herself to fully respect and
88 European Parliament and European Commission (2010) ‘Framework agreement on relations between the
European Parliament and the European Commission’, Official Journal L 304/47, Points 23, 24.
89 Hardly more convincing than, as Larik wrote, “my dog ate my homework”. See Joris Larik, ‘Democratic
scrutiny of EU foreign policy: From pirates to the power of the people’ (Case C-658/11 Parliament v.
Council); 14 August 2014, http://europeanlawblog.eu/?p=2469.
90 Peers, op. cit.
91 Agreement EP – EC, op. cit., point 23.
92 The position is currently (since 1 November 2014) held by Federica Mogherini, previously by Catherine
Ashton.
93 This follows from Arts. 18 and 27 TEU and point 25 of Agreement EP – EC, op. cit.
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implement the Commission’s commitments under the Framework Agreement. In the
name of the “special relationship with the European Parliament” and partnership in the
European policy-making process that she intended to achieve, Catherine Ashton expressly
referred to information to be given to the EP on ongoing negotiations.94 Nevertheless, such
a duty also follows from Article 36 TEU which obliges the HR to “regularly consult the
European Parliament on the main aspects and the basic choices of the [CFSP and CFDP]
and inform it of how those policies evolve” and “ensure that the views of the [EP] are duly
taken into consideration.” Despite the above, the HR failed to provide the EP with infor-
mation on negotiations of the agreement contested in the present case.
In light of the above, it might be argued that the HR infringed not only the promise
she made previously but certain provisions of the Treaties as well. One of the reasons for
the ‘institutional’ uncertainty mentioned above is that Article 218(10) TFEU does not
clarify who is responsible for “immediately and fully” informing “at all stages”, but a
combined reading of Articles 36 TEU and 218(10) TFEU reveals that – beyond the Council’s
default which was apparent from the present judgment – the HR also failed to fulfil her
obligations in the present decision-making process. Nevertheless, as EU law stands at
present, the Treaty ensures no judicial remedy for cases where the HR fails to fulfil her
obligation.95 Thus, from a procedural point of view, there was no reason to make reference
to such a failure, which is not legally enforceable.
27.7 Conclusions
The constitutional significance of the present judgment is unquestionable. With the
recognition of the Parliament’s right to be informed in the procedure for the conclusion
of CFSP related international agreements the Court gives the Parliament an opportunity
to exercise democratic scrutiny over a new field of the European Union’s external action.
At the same time, certain parts of the reasoning and the outcome of the judgment as
a whole have also left some questions open. One arises directly from the tendency that the
more complex the activity of the EU on the international stage is, the less obvious the
borderline between different EU policies becomes. The tension, for instance, between the
claim to extend parliamentary scrutiny in order to ensure respect for human rights over
all EU activities on the one hand and the rigid application of the ‘centre of gravity’ test on
the other, remains unresolved.
94 Committee on Foreign Affairs, Notice to Members, Hearing with Baroness Ashton, Vice-President designate
of the Commission/HR of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy; PE431.071v02-00, 6th of January
2010.
95 The activity of the HR falls outside the scope of Arts. 263 and 265 TFEU.
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The question therefore arises if the consistent application of the rigid ‘centre of gravity’
test is reasonable. An inflexible approach to legal basis disputes on the foundation of this
jurisprudence might be problematic, for instance, from the perspective of human rights
protection. Therefore, it is worth considering how to make the above mentioned test more
applicable to those ‘challenging’ cases where the determination of the legal basis according
to the ‘centre of gravity’ of the contested measure derogates other important values or
interests protected by EU law (such as the parliamentary prerogatives in decision-making
where people’s rights are at stake). The approach used by the Court in its previous case-
law96 seems to be a good starting point in this respect. Going back to the present judgment,
the ‘incidental’ character of a non-CFSP aim pursued by an agreement less evidently justifies
the conclusion that a CFSP agreement may regulate only such issues which, by their very
nature, do not require parliamentary control.97
All in all, by accepting the Parliament’s second request for being “immediately and
fully informed” the Court seems to have given the institution the green light to further
strengthen its position in the EU treaty-making process; this applies to CFSP matters, as
well. However, the practical significance of this prerogative can only be tested in future
procedures where the Parliament will have the opportunity to step onto the stage and
actually make use of its newly recognised power.
96 See especially the Titanium-Dioxide and Kadi judgments above (Section 27.6.3).
97 Viewed from this perspective, the wording of Art. 218(6) TFEU (“Except where agreements relate exclusively
to the common foreign and security policy…” [emphasis added]) is rather misleading, since, as we explained
above, it does not obviously exclude the Parliament’s participation in cases of non-exclusively but only
predominantly CFSP related agreements. I mean, the result of the present judgment would be more consistent
with a Treaty text as follows “Except where agreements relate to the common foreign and security policy…”.
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